





CEM v3.1 aims to:

- eliminate redundant evaluation activities
- reduce/eliminate activities that contribute little to the final assurance of a product
- clarify CEM terminology to reduce misunderstanding
- restructure and refocus the evaluation activities to those areas where security assurance is gained
- and add new CEM requirements if needed.







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- Australia/New Zealand: The Defence Signals Directorate and the Government Communications Security Bureau respectively;
- Canada: Communications Security Establishment;
- France: Direction Centrale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information;
- Germany: Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik;
- Japan: Information Technology Promotion Agency
- Netherlands: Netherlands National Communications Security Agency;
- Spain: Ministerio de Administraciones Públicas and Centro Criptológico Nacional;
- United Kingdom: Communications-Electronics Security Group;
- United States: The National Security Agency and the National Institute of Standards and Technology.







CC CEM

Assurance Class Activity

Assurance Component Subactivity

Evaluator Action Element Action

Developer Action Element


Cont. & pres. Evidence

Work Units












Verdict Assignment





Finse Winter

1ay 3-8, 2009







- all evaluation evidence required for performing these work units is coherent, that is it can be fully and completely understood by the evaluator
- all evaluation evidence required for performing these work units does not have any obvious internal inconsistencies or inconsistencies with other evaluation evidence.







- the requirements for the PP, ST, or TOE under evaluation are not met
- that the evidence is incoherent, or an obvious inconsistency in the evaluation evidence has been found







- test documentation, to allow the evaluator to make an early assessment of tests and test procedures;
- design documents, to provide the evaluator with background for understanding the TOE design;
- source code or hardware drawings, to allow the evaluator to assess the application of the developer's standards.







- Observation reports (ORs)
 Evaluator -> Evaluation authority (sponsor, developer)
- Evaluation Technical Report (ETR)
 Evaluator -> Evlaution authority







the evaluator **shall report**:

- the identifier of the PP or TOE evaluated;
- the evaluation task/sub-activity during which the observation was generated;
- the observation;
- the assessment of its severity (e.g. implies a fail verdict, holds up progress on the evaluation, requires a resolution prior to evaluation being completed);
- the identification of the organisation responsible for resolving the issue;
- the recommended timetable for resolution;
- the assessment of the impact on the evaluation of failure to resolve the observation.



Evaluation Technical Report



- Introduction
- Architectural description of the TOE
- Evaluation
- Results of the evaluation
- Conclusions and recommendations
- List of evaluation evidence
- List of acronyms and glossary of terms
- Observation reports







- Accreditation (NA)
 - Evaluation facilities (Secode, Norconsult)
- Certification (SERTIT)
 - Products
- Evaluation
 - Products
 - Software
 - Hardware
 - Firmware